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I.  INTRODUCTION
The  integration  of  the  Central  and  East  European  countries  (CEECs)  into  the
European  Union  poses  challenges  that,  in  many ways,  are  far  greater  than  those
posed by the earlier expansions of the European  Community.  The gap between  the
income  levels of the current members  of the  EU  and the CEECs  is  greater than  that
with  Spain  and  Portugal  at  the  time  of  their  accession,  for  example,  while  the
agricultural  sectors  of  the  CEECs  will  be  far  more  problematic  for  European
agricultural  policy  than  was  the  case  with  earlier  expansions.  In  addition,  the
economic policy reach of the  EU  is greater than the  EC,  with consequences  for the
legal and  regulatory environment  of prospective  new members.  For these reasons,
the  process  of  accession  will  force  (and  in  important  areas  already  has  forced)
substantial  change  within  the  CEEC  economies.  If managed  properly,  these
changes offer important opportunities for the region.
The  actual  probability and  timing of membership for  individual  candidates  depends  on
the  relatively  complicated  pseudo-calculus  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  eastern
enlargement,  as understood by the powers-that-be  in Brussels.  Of course, part (but only
part)  of this calculus involves the economic consequences for the  EU.  Other elements
include  the  economic  consequences  for  the  East,  the  political  consequences  for
Europe's  emerging  post-Cold  War  policy architecture,  the economic consequences for
individual  sectors  (like  agriculture  and  textiles),  and  the  interaction  of  economic  and
political  consequences  outside the  EU  for  labor  markets  (through  migration  from  the
East)  and  investor confidence  (through  heightened  or  reduced  political  uncertainties).
As  Baldwin  et  al  (1997)  have  argued  from  behind  a  raft  of econometric  estimates  of
budget costs  and computable  general  equilibrium estimates  of macroeconomic  effects,
the  direct  economic  consequences  of  Eastern  enlargement  for  the  current  15  EU
Members  are likely to be rather slight, at most.  Of course, reaching  such a conclusion
does  not  require  the  complexities  of  a  computable  general  equilibrium  model.  The
CEEC  economies  amount,  together,  to  roughly  5  percent  of  the  size  of  the  EU,
measured in terms of GDP.  Hence, even if the EU were to make massive net transfers
to the CEECs (say on the order of 10% of annual CEEC  GDP), this would still amount to
below one half of one cent of GDP.  1  Actual experience suggests that net costs will be
much less than this.  For the EU, the dominant terms in  the decision calculus, therefore,
will be political rather than economic.
*This  paper draws  on joint research  on EU  eastern expansion,  in  particular Baldwin,  Francois,  and
Portes (1997),  and Francois and Baldwin (1996).  All  remaining  errors are the fault of the  author.
1  Recent experience, including Ireland and Portugal, suggests that for institutional reasons,  5 % of
GDP is the effective upper bound for absorption of income transfers from the  EU.
94While the invitation list and schedule from  Brussels to the  Eastern  enlargement  party
will  depend  in  large part  on  political  considerations,  economic  analysis  still  has  an
important  role  left  to  play.  This  involves the  assessment  of  the  mechanics  of  EU
enlargement.  This is true for 2 reasons.  The first is that, while enlargement  may not
loom large in the macroeconomy  of Western  Europe,  it does loom  large for individual
sectors.  In  agriculture,  for  example,  the  potential  scale  of  CEEC  agricultural
production (especially under the current regime)  renders current agricultural  policy  in
the  EU  unsustainable.  The  second  reason  relates  to  the  CEEC  economies
themselves.  They may be small relative to the economic weight  of the EU15.  By the
same measure,  however,  membership  promises  strong  pressures  to  restructure  the
pattern of production within the CEEC  economies.
This paper is concerned with the economics underlying the  integration of the CEECs
into  the  EU.  As  a  starting  point,  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  economic  and  policy
environment  in which such  a  process  is  likely to  take  place.  In part,  this  relates  to
differences in production and protection  structures.  These differences  point strongly
to the  issue of timing and the harmonisation of border measures  as crucial  factors in
the adjustment  costs to  be  borne by the  CEEC  economies.  At the  same time,  the
role of the EU  as a policy reform  anchor is also emphasised.  Like the earlier Iberian
expansion,  the  Eastern  expansion  offers  a  chance to  further  anchor  market-based
economic  reforms  during  a  time  of  political  and  economic  transition,  with
ramifications  for  the  overall  investment  climate  in  the  region.  The  relative
importance  of  market  integration  (through  preferential  trade  liberalization)  and
investment  effects  are  examined  with  reference  to  applied  general  equilibrium
modeling of the integration process.
II.  TRADE
Trade flows
The  EU15  sells  about  $40  billion  to  the  CEECs  and  buys  slightly  less  from  them.
This  trade covers  a broad  range  of goods and  consists  mainly of two-way  trade  in
similar  products,  as  Figure  1  shows.  With  the  exceptions  of  clothing  and  light
manufactures  (where the CEECs  are net exporters)  and heavy machinery (where the
EU  is  a  net  exporter)  the  EU-CEEC  trade  is  approximately  balanced  product  by
product.  The  relative  importance  of such  intra-industry  trade  has  ramifications  for
the  political  economy  of  trade  liberalisation.  With  this  sort  of  trade  structure,
reciprocal  liberalisation can force sectors to expand  in both regions  due to  improved
exploitation of scale economies.  At the same time, the relatively unbalanced  nature
of trade  in  capital  goods  points  to  the  potential  for  significant enlargement-related
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-E  U)The  EU15's  trade  with  the  CEECs  is  distributed  in  a  very  disproportionate  manner,
with  Germany  alone accounting  for 42%  of EU15  exports  to  the  CEECs.  No  other
member  state  accounts  for  more  than  10%  of  the  EU15  total.  Austria,  Belgium,
Finland,  Britain,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and  France  each  account  for  5%  or  more  of
the  total.  On  the other  extreme,  the  exports of Portugal  and  Ireland  to  the  CEECs
account for  less than  2%  of the EU  total.  On  a  sectoral  basis,  the  most  important
sector  is  machinery  and  equipment,  in  terms  of  impact  on  overall  EU  trade.  Even
here,  however,  the  current  EU  export performance  in the  sector  is  a direct  result  of
CEEC  protection  (see  below),  and  hence  will  not  be  sustainable  after  CEEC
membership.  The  last  salient  point  concerns  the disparity  between  the  importance
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0Comparing  Figures  2  and  3,  we see  that the  EU  market  is critical  to  CEEC  exports,
amounting  to  50-60% of all  exports  (approximately the  importance  of the  EU  market
for EU  nations themselves).  However,  the CEEC  market  is fairly  unimportant  to the
EU  exporters.  While the welfare  gains from  trade generally stem  from  imports  rather
than exports,  national trade policies are typically influenced by  mercantilist concerns.
It  is  therefore  useful  to  note  that  the  average  EU  figure  hides  a  good  deal  of
dispersion.  For Germany,  Austria,  Greece and  Finland  the  figure  is  at  least  double
average  (4% for manufactures, closer to 8%  with services),  but for  Portugal,  Ireland,
Spain and the UK,  the CEEC  markets  are only half as  important as the  EU average.
II.  PATTERNS  OF PROTECTION
Due to the  Europe Agreements,  the  EU  has phased  out all  statutory  tariffs  on  CEEC
industrial  goods,  and  the  CEECs  are  in  the  process  of  phasing  out  the  same  on
imports from the  EU  (Faini  and  Portes  1995).  However,  it is  important  to remember
that  duty-free treatment  of  industrial  goods  is not  really  preferential  treatment  in a
European context since about 80% of EU  imports are accorded  such status.  In other
words,  zero  statutory  tariffs  merely  level  the  playing  field  for  Europe's  major
suppliers.  Moreover,  zero  statutory  tariffs  do  not  mean  free  trade.  EU-imposed
antidumping duties and  price-fixing arrangements  meant to avoid  such duties greatly
restrict  CEEC  exports  in  those  areas in which  they could  expand  sales  most  rapidly.
The  EU  has  used various measures,  including antidumping  duties  (see Table  1),  to
limit  CEEC  exports  of  iron  and  steel.  The  European  cement  cartel  has  also
succeeded  in  using  the  same  laws  to  block  potential  competition  from  the  East.
(Again,  see  Table  1).  The  EU  also  continues  to  impose  quotas  on  other  so-called
sensitive  industrial  goods  such as textiles, clothing and footwear.  At  the  same time,
restrictions on  CEEC  exports of non-industrial  goods - especially agricultural  goods -
have been  liberalized only slightly by the  EU.
100Table 1
Products subject to EU  anti-dumping
December  1995
actions as  of
Country








Iron  or steel sections
Pig-iron  (hematite)
Artificial corundum













Synthetic textile fibres of polyester
Welded tubes of iron  or steel
Sheets and  plates of iron  or steel
note:  includes final duties and  price  undertakings, preliminary  actions, and
products  under investigation.
source:  official  journals
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Post-Uruguay  Round  applied tariff rates,  mfn
European  Czech &
Union  CEECs  Slovak CU  Hungary  Poland  Romania
agriculture excluding  15.7  1.1  -0.3  -1.5  1.3  4.
fish and fish  11  7.8  0  17.3  11.5  22.1
petroleum  0.4  1.8  0.5  0  2.9  3
wood  and wood  0.3  4.3  4.8  3.3  5.3  8.
textiles and  8.7  9.5  6.6  8.5  10.4  22.
leather and  4.9  7.1  3.4  6.5  8  20.
metals  1  4.1  1.9  3.9  5.2  7.
chemicals  3.8  6.3  4.1  4.2  7.3  15.
ransport  5.5  13.6  6.9  16.1  10.7  28.
nonelectrical  1.4  6  3.3  7.5  6.4  15.
electrical machinery  5.4  9.7  5.4  8.8  '9.5  25.1
mineral  products  0.5  2.4  1.8  2.5  2.2  2.
other  2.5  5.1  2.5  4.6  5.8  8.
All  industrial  2.9  6.4  3.7  6.7  6.9  11.
All  merchandise  2.8  6.7  3.8  6.8  6.9  11.
source:  World  Bank,  Finger et al,
Table  2 presents  the  MFN  applied  tariff rates  for the  EU and the CEECs for a range
of products.  There  are  three  main  points to be highlighted.  First, the  CEECs are on
average  more  protectionist  than  the  EU,  although  both  are  quite  open  when
compared to developing  countries in Asia,  Africa and  Latin America.  Based  on  MFN
rates,  the  CEECs'  average  applied tariff is 6.5%  while the  EU's  is  3%.  Second,  the
CEECs'  average  of 6.5%  consists of  somewhat  higher-than-EU  rates  on  industrial
goods  but  much  lower-than-EU  rates  on  agricultural  goods.  As  a  result,  the
enlargement  is likely to lead  to an  important  increase  in  CEEC  agricultural  protection
against  third-country suppliers.  The  same  sort of pattern  emerged  with  the  Iberian
accession,  and  in  that  instance  third-countries,  notably  the  US,  demanded
compensation for the hikes in farm protection.  The last point  is that the gap between
the CEEC  and EU rates varies widely among  industrial goods.  For instance, the gap
is more than  10%  in transport equipment but less than 2%  in textiles and clothing.
This asymmetry  of protection rates has  important  implications for the welfare effects
of enlargement.  Since  the  EU  is  the  major  trading  partner  for  the  CEECs,  (See
Figure  3),  and  since this relationship will  involve free trade,  the  ongoing process  of
joining the  EU  implies a great  deal  of tariff cutting in  the CEECs,  but  very  little tariff
cutting in the  EU  (especially  since  imports from  the  CEECs  amount  to  only 4%  of
EU15  imports).  On the export  side,  the one  sector where  the CEECs  account for a
disproportionate share  of EU  exports  is  transport  equipment.  This is a direct result
of  CEEC  protection  in this  sector  against  third  markets,  and  is unlikely  to  be
sustainable after full membership.
With  most  gains  for  the  smaller  partner  through  own-liberalisation  (controlling  for
possible trade diversion), the initial levels of protection suggest that enlargement  will
lead to much  greater income gains  in  the CEECs than  in the  EU.  At the same time,
like  the  pattern  of  trade,  the  pattern  of  protection  also  suggests  that  negative
restructuring  in  the CEECs  will  most  likely  be  concentrated  in  heavy  industry.  This
last point follows, again, from  the asymmetry  of tariff rates  across the EU  and  CEEC
102economies.  Given  the  relative  size  of  the  EU15  and  CEECS,  any  tariff
harmonisation will be at EU  rates.  Because  EU  protection  is lower  in  heavy  industry,
and  CEEC  protection  is  much  higher,  this  implies  a  second  round  of  structural
adjustment following harmonisation.
III.  INVESTMENT
At the  moment,  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  constitute a  relatively  risky  investment
climate.  The  uncertainty  stems  from  microeconomic  sources  and  macroeconomic
sources.  Since the  transitions  began,  the  micro  sources  have  included,  inter alia,
bank  failures,  privatization,  bankruptcies,  unpredictable  changes  in  subsidy,  trade
and  indirect  tax  policies,  sudden  changes  in  the  legal  system,  and  industrial
standards  and regulation,  and  changes  in administrative  procedures.  Nervousness
of  investors  has  been  further  exacerbated  by  the  East  Asian  and  Russian  crises.
Yet,  at  least in those  CEECs  that seem  likely to join the  EU  soon,  the prospect  of
membership  has already greatly  reduced this  riskiness  in  one very  direct way.  EU
membership  gives investors some  idea of the direction  in  which  economic  policy  is
heading.  Such  is  not the  case for those economies with  more  distant  prospects  of
joining the EU.
The  macro  sources  of uncertainty  include  unanticipated  changes  in  inflation  rates,
interest  rates  and exchange  rates.  In  many of the CEECs  these  macro  sources  of
instability  are  linked  to  the  micro  sources.  One  classic  link  is  that  attempts  to
subsidise sunset industries on a large scale basis lead to  large fiscal  deficits that are
covered  by printing money.  Also,  a  large measure of the inflation  in  these countries
stems  from  initial  price  shocks  that  occurred  when  prices  were  liberalized  and
currencies  deeply devalued.  Finally,  given the  continued  risk  of  yet  more  political
instability  in  Russia  and  the  lack of  full  security  guarantees,  there  remains  some
small uncertainty about territorial  integrity in the region.
Also underlying  investor nervousness about current reform  is the importance  of political
economy  constraints  in  the  economic  reform  process.  As  Williamson  (1990)  has
emphasized,  not all stable  policy regimes  are characterized  by  good  practice.  In fact,
through most  of history, and across most  of the world,  regimes  conducive to stagnation
and decline  have been remarkably tenacious  and even  robust.  Not surprisingly, given
the  demonstrated  difficulties  inherent  in  pursuing  good  long-run  policies  both  through
painful  short-  and  medium-run  adjustments,  and  through  sustained  pressures  of  rent
seeking  (and  rent preservation),  an  important  theme to  emerge  in some of the  recent
development literature is the potentially positive role, at least in the economic arena, that
can be played by institutional mechanisms that anchor such policies.  (Francois, 1997).
Joining  the  EU  should  make the  CEECs  substantially  less  risky from  the  point  of
view of domestic and foreign  investors.  On the micro side,  EU  membership  greatly
constrains  arbitrary  trade  and  indirect  tax  policy  changes.  It also  locks  in  well-
defined  property  rights  and  codifies  competition  policy  and  state-aids  policy.  By
securing  convertibility,  open  capital  markets  and  rights  of  establishment,
membership  assures  investors  (especially West  European  investors)  that  they  can
put  in  and  take  out  money.  Finally,  EU  membership  guarantees  that  CEEC-
produced  products  have  unparalleled  access  to  the  EU15  markets  (which  account
for almost 30%  of world  income).  On the  macro  side,  membership  puts  the CEECs
103on a path toward  a more  secure relationship with  the monetary union,  thus providing
a  solid hedge  against  inflation spurts.  These two  aspects  of membership  are  likely
to  have  a  related  impact  on  investor  confidence  and  are  likely  to  be  mutually
reinforcing.
The economics of investment effects
What  are  the  likely  investment  effects  of such a fall  in  country  risk?  These  relate  to
dynamic mechanisms,  and have been examined  in the context  of simulation analysis  by
Kehoe  (1994) and Romero  (1994)  for Mexico  and  Baldwin  et  al  (1997)  for the  CEECs.
They  are  illustrated  conceptually  in  Figure  4,  where  the  curve  MPKo  represents  the
marginal  product of capital,  and where the  line  rO  represents current  lending conditions
on international capital  markets.  Conditions for  international capital lending will reflect a
number  of  a  factors,  including  risk  of  nationalization,  and  the  security  provided  by
outside obligations (i.e. the Mexican GATT  accession in  1986 and the NAFTA, or CEEC




0)As  elements are  added  to the  climate  that reduce  the  underlying  risk premium,  this  is
reflected in a shift in rO to ri.  In Figure 4, the national income  gain from  this reduced  risk
premium  is  the area  abcd.  This  is  related  to  expanded  production  and  rising  labour
productivity and wages.  Arguably, this effect may  be one of the most important medium-
to long-run effects of anchoring investment-related external policy reforms.
In addition  to  reduced  risk, there  are other  effects that  will  also follow  from  increased
demand for investment capital as the region grows.  In terms of the figure, this involves  a
shift in the  marginal  demand for capital from  MPK o to  MPK,  . The gains  from  reduced
risk would then interact with the economic expansion, yielding the gains abef
Cross-country evidence
The statement that EU  membership will  make the CEECs  less risky sites for physical
investments seems relatively uncontroversial.  The hard, and therefore controversial,
part  is  to  quantify the  impact  that enlargement  will  have  on  CEEC  risk  premiums.
One approach  involves cross-country comparison  of  investment conditions.  Rates of
return  on  capital differ sharply across  nations,  and these  differences  are  often  very
persistent.
One common  explanation for this is  that investors demand  a  risk premium  on  funds
invested  in  nations with  economic and/or political  environments  that  are  perceived
as unstable.  As figure 5 shows,  country risk does correlate with  rates of return.  The
figure plots,  on  the  horizontal axis,  World  Bank estimates  of the basis  point  spread
charged to emerging  economies for dollar-denominated  fixed  rate  issues  in  1994-95
(World  Debt  Tables,  1996  Extracts,  World  Bank  1996).  The  vertical  axis  plots
country  risk indexes  (from  the  Economist  Intelligence  Unit)  for  1995.2  The  Czech
Republic,  Poland,  and  Hungary  are  arrayed  along the  middle  of the spectrum,  with
the  Czech  Republic  ranked  as  the  best  risk  and  Hungary  as  the  worst.  Poland  is
ranked  as a risk comparable  to  Greece.  Russia  is off the  charts  on  both axes,  and
data for Bulgaria and  Romania  are unavailable  (not  a  good  omen).  The unweighed
CEEC  average for those in the sample (not  shown)  is located  quite  close to  Poland.
In  the  context  of  the  figure,  an  important  goal  of  CEEC  membership  is  to  move
individual countries toward the South West region  in the figure.
2 A similar pattern  (not shown)  holds for the spread  on the effective dollar yield of domestic debt issues



































































There  is  also historical  evidence suggesting  a  correlation  between  investment  and
membership,  at  least  in  poor  entrants.  A  range  of  case  studies  for  the  Iberian
countries  support the  basic notion that  EU  membership  can  be good  for  investment
in  poor entrants.  For  Spain,  the boost  to  investment from  accession  and the effect
on  the current account are  documented  by Vinals,  1990;  Ortega,  et  al.,  1990).  The
stimulus  to  foreign  investment  is  analyzed  by  Bajo  and  Sosvilla  (1992).  For  both
Portugal  and  Spain,  Braga  de  Macedo  and  Torres  (1990)  specifically  demonstrate
the decline in country risk premium following  accession.
For  the  six  countries  that  joined  the  EC  during  the  1973,  1981  and  1986
enlargements  (Denmark,  Ireland  and  UK  in  1973,  Greece  in  1981,  and  Portugal
and  Spain  in  1986),  there  was  generally  an  increase  in  capital.  In addition,  the
Iberian  enlargement  was  accompanied  by  a  stock  market  boom  (while  the  Greek
accession  did  not  produce  such  a  result).  Of the  1973  entrants,  Ireland  is  doing
much  better than the average  of the  incumbents.  This  fits  in  with  the  general  idea
that  enlargement  is  likely to  have  the  greatest  impact  on  the  countries  that  are
economically  the  furtherest  behind  the  EU  incumbents.  When  it comes  to  stock
market  data,  Greece  is  the  exception  among  the  poor  entrants.  The  poor
perfomance  of Greece  is echoed across several financial  indicators.  Greece hence
serves as  a  reminder  that while  EU  membership  provides  an  opportunity  for  poor
countries  to  catch  up,  there  is  nothing  automatic  about  the  benefits.  (Baldwin  et
1997).
Historically, the closest parallels with  the CEECs  are  in the  Iberian  peninsula.  Until
the mid-1970s,  Portugal  and  Spain  were  under dictatorships that  typically  ruled  the
economies  with  a  heavy  and  sometimes  arbitrary  hand.  Investment  in  these
countries was consequently  a  risky business for those without  close connections  to
the  dictators.  The  end  of  Iberian  dictatorships  and  their  EU  membership  bids
transformed the investment climate on the Iberian peninsula.  This was followed  by a
catch-up  process  driven,  in  part,  by  investment.  On  net,  the  historical  evidence
provides  a  prima  facie  case  that  EU  accession  can  be  helpful  in  encouraging
investment  in  poor  entrants  (namely  Spain,  Portugal  and  Ireland),  and  support for
the  assertion  that  the  Iberian  investment-led  growth  in  the  1980s  was  greatly
boosted  by the prospect of EU  membership.
IV.  ESTIMATES  OF LIKELY EFFECTS
We  turn  next  to  estimates  of  the  likely  effects  of  accession.  The  basis  for  these
estimates  is  computable  general  equilibrium  simulations  of  various  accession
scenarios,  as  described in Baldwin  et  al  (1997)  and  Baldwin  and  Francois  (1996).
The  general  equilibrium  model  is a  global  model,  covering  all  world  trade  and
production.  It allows  for scale  economies,  imperfect  competition  and  endogenous
capital  stocks.  Interested  readers  are  referred  to the 50-page  technical  appendix to
Francois,  McDonald  and  Nordstrom  (1995)  for detailed  discussion of the theoretical
structure of the model.  The data structure and policy experiments  for this application
are  discussed  in  Baldwin  et al  (1997).  The model  is  calibrated  to  social  accounting
data  from  the  Global Trade Analysis  Project (GTAP)  version  3  dataset.  The GTAP
dataset includes information  on national  and regional input-output structure,  bilateral
108trade  flows,  final  demand  patterns,  and  government  intervention,  and  is
benchmarked  to  1992.  Protection  data  are based on  World  Bank and  WTO  data on
pre-  and  post-Uruguay  Round  protection.  We work  with  the  post  Uruguay-round
protection data.
Table 3
Macroeconomic  effects of EU  enlargement,
changes  in GNP in billion ECU  and  percent
conservative  estimates  less  conservative  estimates
CEEC7  2.5 b ECU  (1.5 %)  30.1  b ECU  (18.8  %)
EU15  9.8 b ECU  (0.2 %)  11.2bECU  (  0.2 %)
EFTA3  0.2 b ECU  (0.1  %)  0.1  b  ECU  (  0.1  %)
Ex-USSR  1.1  b ECU  (0.3 %)  2.1  b ECU  (  0.6 %)
note:  conservative case  involves no foreign  investment.
less conservative case  involves induced foreign investment.
source:  Baldwin,  Francois,  and Portes (1997).
Table 4
Sectoral  output effects for
CEECs,  percent
long  run effects,
with foreign
investment
agriculture,  forestry, fisheries  16.40
primary mining  and fuels  20.98
processed foods  20.69
textiles  140.23
apparel  87.62
non-ferrous metals  -22.22
iron  and steel  9.23
chemicals,  rubber, and  plastics  59.86
fabricated  metal  products  -9.81
transport equipment  -87.59
other machinery  and  equipment  -39.72
other manufactures  14.26
services  25.26
Standard  deviation of output*  57.40
Mean  change  in output  18.09
109Sectoral  output effects for EU15,
percent
long  run effects,
with foreign
investment
agriculture, forestry,  fisheries  0.00
primary  mining  and fuels  0.13
processed foods  -0.01
textiles  -11.53
apparel  -2.48
non-ferrous metals  0.85
iron  and steel  -0.66
chemicals,  rubber,  and  plastics  -1.47
fabricated  metal products  0.92
transport equipment  1.65
other machinery and  equipment  1.40
other manufactures  0.28
services  0.19
standard deviation of output*  3.38
Mean  change  in ouput  -0.83
*defined as SD = SQRT((SUM(qo**2))/n)),  where n  is the number of sectors and  qo
is the normalized  (i.e.  percent)  deviation in sectoral output.
Tables  3  and  4  present  estimates  of  the  impact  of  accession  on  the  CEEC
economies.  Table 3 presents estimates of the impact on regional  GNP.  The first set
of estimates  involves only the  static effects  of trade  liberalisation,  without  induced
foreign  investment.  Even  in this base case,  it is clear that the impact  on the  CEECs
is  much  greater,  in  relative  terms,  than  the  impact on  the  EU.  The  second  set  of
estimates  includes induced  investment effects.  Based on a "best guess" of the fall  in
cost  of  capital  for  the  CEEC  economies  (see  discussion  in  Baldwin  et  al),  these
estimates  are  far  greater  than  those  from  trade  liberalisation  alone.  While  the
individual  estimates  are  crude  at  best,  the  point  they  highlight  is  striking.  The
important  economic  impact  of  accession  is  going  to  follow  from  increased
investment,  and  not  from  increased  trade.  In  terms  of gains  related  directly  to
improved  market  access, these gains  are  almost  secondary.  They  are  likely  to  be
swamped  by induced investment effects, if membership  has  an effect  comparable to
the one that followed the Iberian accession.
Table  4  presents  estimates  of  sectoral  adjustment.  Like  the  macroeconomic
estimates,  it  is  best  to view  these  sectoral  effects with  extreme  scepticism.  They
reflect the  necessity of sometimes  Herculean  assumptions  about  social  accounting
data (i.e.  the  benchmark structure of  production)  in  a  region  undergoing  dramatic
transition.  Even  so, the basic pattern  of CEEC  effects, viewed  alongside those for
the  EU,  is  striking.  Clearly,  most  of the  sectoral  adjustment,  at  least  in  relative
terms, is likely to be felt by the CEEC  economies.  The concerns raised earlier, with
regard  to  the  pattern  of  protection,  are  manifested  in  the  relative  collapse  of  the
heavy  machinery  sector  in  the  CEEC  economies.  Of course,  such  effects  will  be
influence  by  government  subsidies,  contingent  protection,  and  related  measures.
Still, the results suggest that the process  of harmonisation  of CEEC tariffs with those
of the  EU  will  place  considerable  pressure  on  their  heavy  industrial  sectors.  This
110may  be  manifested  in  actual  changes  in  output,  or  otherwise  in  a  political  solution
involving the machinery of EU  economic policy and support mechanisms.  Whatever
the outcome,  it is clear that to  keep the accession process (and  implicitly the  reform
process)  viable,  attention  must  be  paid to the adjustment  process undergone  in  the
CEEC  economies.
V.  FINAL RUMINATIONS
This paper has been concerned  with the process  of integrating the CEEC  economies
into the European Union.  Recent estimates (Baldwin et al) indicate  that the costs
and benefits for the EU will  be relatively small,  at  least  in  economic  terms.  The
decision  made by Member governments regarding membership will,  therefore, be
determined  in  the end  by political  considerations,  which  should  dominate  the  small
contribution made to the total decision calculus by economic factors.
The same does not hold true for the CEEC  economies.  Given the relative size of the
two  regions,  the  long-term  economic  benefits  of  membership  for  the  CEEC
economies are  indeed very important.  At the same time,  these  benefits  are  likely to
involve  significant  pressures  for  restructuring.  Since  political  factors  appear  to
dominate the decision calculus for the CEEC  governments as well,  the economics  of
the  process  forces  the  question  of  the  appropriate  structure  of  the  accession
process.  In  this  regard,  one  important  point  relates  to  the  divergent  nature  of  EU
and  CEEC  tariff  rates.  It  will  be  important  that,  to  the  extent  possible  within
GATT/WTO  obligations,  CEEC  rates  of  protection  be  harmonised  toward  EU  rates
before  actual  accession.  At  the  same  time,  industrial  assistance  (like  investment
subsidies)  to  sectors  that  will  lose  protection  should  be  phased  out  as  part  of this
same process.  Otherwise,  membership  will be followed by appeals to Brussels from
these same sectors for protection.
Also,  it  is  important to  keep in  mind that investment effects dominate  the direct trade
effects  of  EU  accession.  This  means  that  the  cost  of  a  failed  membership  bid,  or
signals  of  prevarication  by  Brussels,  may  go  well  beyond  the  direct  benefits  of
secure access to  EU  markets.  The prospect of EU  membership  has  already gone  a
long  way  toward  easing  capital  costs  down  in  the  leading  CEEC  economies.  By
1995,  for  example,  the  Czech  Republic  had  almost  graduated  to  the  point  of
borrowing on the same terms as some of its fellow OECD  members.  Loss of investor
confidence in the process, or even signals that the probability of a failed membership
bid is nontrivial, could begin the reversal of this process.
111References
Anderson,  K. and J.F. Francois  (1997), "Commercial  Links  Between  Western Europe
and East Asia:  Retsrospect and  Propspect,"  in  P. Drysdale and  D.  Vines,
eds.,  Europe,  East Asia, and APEC,  Cambridge  University Press,  1998,  31-
52,
Baldwin,  R.E..and  J.F. Francois  (1996),  "Scale  Economies,  Imperfect Competition,
and the Eastern  Expansion of the EU,"  paper presented  at conference  on
Eastern  enlargement of the EU,  Justus Leibig  University,  Giessen.
Baldwin,  R.E.,  J.F. Francois,  and R.E.  Portes, "The costs and benefits of Eastern
enlargement:  the impact on the EU  and Central  Europe,"  Economic Policy:
24 (April),  127-170.
Bajo,  0. and S. Sosvilla (1992).  "Inversion directa extranjera en Espana," Moneda y
Credito,  no.  194.
Braga de Macedo,  J. and F. Torres (1990).  "Interest differentials,  integration  and
EMS shadowing:  a note on Portugal with a comparison to Spain,"  in  J.S.
Lopes and M.  Beleza (eds.),  Portugal and the Internal Market of the EEC,
Banco de Portugal,  Lisbon.
Faini,  R.,  and R.  Portes,  (1995).  "Opportunities Outweigh Adjustment:  The Political
Economy of Trade with Central and Eastern Europe,"  in  R.  Faini and  R
Portes,  eds., EU Trade with Eastern Europe: Adjustment and Opportunities,
CEPR.
Finger,  J.M.,  U. Reincke, and M.  Ingco  (1996), "The Uruguay  Round:  Statistics  on
Tariff Concessions Given and Received,"  International Trade  Division of the
International  Economics Department,  World Bank, mimeo.
Francois, J.F.  (1994),  "Global Production and Trade:  Factor Migration  and
Commercial  Policy with  International  Returns to Scale," International
Economic Review.
Francois, J.F.  (1997),  "External  Bindings and the Credibility of Reform,"  in  A. Galal
and B. Hoekman,  eds.,  Regional Partners in  Global Markets, Cambridge
University Press,  1997.
Francois, J.F.,  B. MacDonald, H. Nordstrom (1995), "Assessing the Uruguay Round,"
in W. Martin and A. Winters, eds. The Uruguay Round and the Developing
Economies, The World Bank discussion paper 201.
Francois, J.F. and D.W. Roland-Hoist (1997),  "Scale Economies and Imperfect
Competition  in Applied Trade Models," in J.F. Francois and K.A.  Reinert, eds.,
Applied methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook, Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
112Grabbe,  H.,  and K. Hughes (1996).  "The impact of enlargement on EU trade and
indutrial policy,"  in J. Redmond  and G.  Rosenthal (eds.), Enlargements  of the
European Union: Past, Present and Future_ forthcoming.
Hertel,  T. editor (1996),  Global Trade Analysis,  Cambridge  University  Press,
Cambridge.
Ortega,E., J. Salarina,  and J. Vinals (1990),  "Spain's  current and  capital account
balances with the EEC,"  in  Bank for International  Settlements,  International
Capital Flows, Exchange Rate Determination and Current Account Balances,
Basel.
Vinals, J. (1994)  "Spain  and the 'EC cum 92'  shock," in  C.  Bliss and  J.  Braga de
Macedo  (eds),  Unity with Diversity in the European Community, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
World Trade Organization  (1996),  Trade Policy Review: European  Union  1995,
Geneva.
World Trade  Organization (1996),  Trade Policy Review: Czech Republic  1995,
Geneva.
World Trade  Organization (1996),  Trade Policy Review: Slovakia  1995, Geneva.
113